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ABSTRACT
Cybercriminals have leveraged the popularity of a large user base
available on Online Social Networks (OSNs) to spread spam cam-
paigns by propagating phishing URLs, attaching malicious contents,
etc. However, another kind of spam attacks using phone numbers
has recently become prevalent on OSNs, where spammers adver-
tise phone numbers to attract users’ attention and convince them
to make a call to these phone numbers. The dynamics of phone
number based spam is different from URL-based spam due to an
inherent trust associated with a phone number. While previous
work has proposed strategies to mitigate URL-based spam attacks,
phone number based spam attacks have received less attention.
In this paper, we aim to detect spammers that use phone num-
bers to promote campaigns on Twitter. To this end, we collected
information (tweets, user meta-data, etc.) about 3, 370 campaigns
spread by 670, 251 users. We model the Twitter dataset as a hetero-
geneous network by leveraging various interconnections between
different types of nodes present in the dataset. In particular, we
make the following contributions – (i) We propose a simple yet
effective metric, called Hierarchical Meta-Path Score (HMPS) to mea-
sure the proximity of an unknown user to the other known pool of
spammers. (ii) We design a feedback-based active learning strategy
and show that it significantly outperforms three state-of-the-art
baselines for the task of spam detection. Our method achieves 6.9%
and 67.3% higher F1-score and AUC, respectively compared to the
best baseline method. (iii) To overcome the problem of less train-
ing instances for supervised learning, we show that our proposed
feedback strategy achieves 25.6% and 46% higher F1-score and AUC
respectively than other oversampling strategies. Finally, we per-
form a case study to show how our method is capable of detecting
those users as spammers who have not been suspended by Twitter
(and other baselines) yet.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are becoming more and more popu-
lar in the recent years, used by millions of users. As a result, OSNs
are being abused by spam campaigners to carry out phishing and
spam attacks [18]. While attacks carried using URLs [8, 16, 18, 42,
47] has been extensively explored in the literature, attacks via a new
action token, i.e., a phone number is mostly unexplored. Tradition-
ally, spammers have been exploiting telephony system in carrying
out social engineering attacks either by calling victims or sending
SMS [45]. Recently, spammers have started abusing OSNs where
they float phone numbers controlled by them. Besides exploiting
trust associated with a phone number, spammers save efforts in
reaching out their victims themselves.
Present Work: Problem definition. In this paper, we aim to
detect spam campaigners (aka, spammers) spreading spam cam-
paigns using phone numbers on Twitter. We here define spammers
as user accounts that use phone numbers to aggressively promote
products, disseminate pornography, entice victims for lotteries and
discounts, or simply mislead victims by making false promises.
Discovering the correspondence between the spammer accounts
and the resources (such as URL or phone number) used for spam
activities is a crucial task. As the phone numbers are being prop-
agated by spammers, and their monetization revenue starts once
people call them, it is fair to assume that these phone numbers
would be under their control. As an added advantage of this, if
we can identify the spammer accounts in Twitter and bring them
down, the entire campaign would get disintegrated. To identify
spammers, we model the Twitter dataset as a heterogeneous graph
where there are different connections between heterogeneous type
of entities: users, campaigns, and the action tokens (phone number
or URL) as shown in Figure 1. Heterogeneous networks have been
proposed for data representation in a variety of datasets like path
similarity in scholar data [39], link prediction in social network
data [22], etc. Objects of different types and links carry different
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Figure 1: Twitter modeled as a heterogeneous network.
semantics. For instance, a phone number being a more stable re-
source would help in connecting user accounts over an extended
period. Physical identity verification is required to purchase phone
numbers, while only e-mail verification is sufficient to purchase
domains. Studying similarity between a pair of nodes keeping the
heterogeneous nature of the network helps in distinguishing the
semantics of different types of paths connecting these two nodes.
To distinguish the semantics among paths connecting two nodes,
we introduce a meta-path based similarity framework for nodes
of the same type in the heterogeneous network. A meta-path is
a sequence of relations between node types, which defines a new
composite relation between its starting type and ending type. It
provides a powerful mechanism to classify objects sharing similar
semantics appropriately.
PresentWork: Motivation of the work. The problem of iden-
tifying spammers on Twitter that use phone numbers is useful in
many aspects. Attacks using phone numbers and URLs are different
in some aspects: in URL based spam, the campaign propagates and
spreads on the same medium, i.e., OSNs, while in case of phone
number based spam, the attacking medium is a telephone and the
propagating medium is OSNs. As a result, it is challenging for OSN
service providers to track down the accounts spreading these spam
campaigns. In addition, there is no meta-data available for phone
numbers, unlike URLs where landing page information, length of
URLs, obfuscation, etc. can be checked. Perhaps due to the chal-
lenges associated with finding spam phone numbers, there have
been several attacks and financial losses caused by the phone-based
attacks [31]. Using the collective classification approach proposed
in the paper, Twitter will be able to find potential spammers and sus-
pend the accounts, thereby restricting phone number based spam
campaigns.
Present Work: A collective classification approach for de-
tecting spam campaigners. In this work, we use the collective
classification approach that exploits the dependencies of a group of
linked nodes where some class labels are known and labels diffuse
to other unknown nodes in the network. In our case, the known
nodes are the already suspended Twitter users that were propagat-
ing campaigns with phone numbers. Here, we propose Hierarchical
Meta-Path Score (HMPS), a simple yet effective similaritymeasure be-
tween a pair of nodes in the heterogeneous network. We first build
campaign-specific hierarchical trees from the large heterogeneous
network. We then systematically extract most relevant meta-paths
from a pool of meta-paths linking various heterogeneous nodes.
We collected tweets and other meta-data information of users
from April-October, 2016, and identified 3, 370 campaigns, contain-
ing 670, 251 users (Section 2). Each tweet carries a phone number.
We consider user accounts suspended by Twitter as ground-truth
spammers. However, due to the lack of enough training samples per
campaign, we introduce a novel feedback-based active learningmech-
anism that uses a SVM-based one-class classifier for each campaign.
Over multiple iterations, it keeps accumulating evidences from dif-
ferent campaigns to enrich the training set for each campaign. This,
in turn, enhances the prediction performance of individual classi-
fiers. The process terminates when there is no chance of finding
the label of the unknown users across iterations.
Summary of the evaluation. We compare our model with
three state-of-the-art baselines used for spam detection (Section 5.3).
We design various experimental setup to perform a thorough eval-
uation of our proposed method. We observe that our model out-
performs the best baseline method by achieving 44.8%, 16.7%, 6.9%,
67.3% higher performance in terms of accuracy, precision, F1-score
and AUC (Section 5.3). We further demonstrate how / why one-class
classifier (Section 5.4), active learning (Section 5.5) and feedback-
based learning (Section 5.6) are better than 2-class classifier, general
learning and other oversampling method, respectively. Moreover,
we conduct a case study and present an intuitive justification why
our method is superior to the other methods (Section 5.3).
2 DATASET
We collected tweets containing phone numbers from Twitter based
on an exhaustive list of 400 keywords via Twitter streaming API.
We chose Twitter due to easy availability of data. The data was
collected from April - October, 2016. Since we intended to detect
campaigns around phone numbers, the keywords we chose were
specific to phone number such as ‘call’, ‘SMS’, ‘WA’, ‘ring’ etc. We
accumulated ∼ 22 million tweets, each of which containing at
least one phone number. The reason behind collecting only tweets
containing phone numbers is that they are found to be a stable
resource, i.e., spammers use them for a long period due to attached
cost. Moreover, the phone numbers are known to help in forming
better user communities [9], which is the basis of the approach
adopted in this work.
Campaign identification:We define a campaign as a group of
similar posts shared by a set of users propagating multiple phone
numbers. A phone number could be a part of multiple campaigns;
however, in this work, we restrict the phone number to be part of
a single campaign (since our campaign detection approach is text-
based, we want the campaigns to be coherent). Note that, multiple
phone numbers could be a part of a single campaign. The detailed
approach for campaign identification is shown in Figure 2 using a
toy example for three phone numbers as described below:
Step 1: Aggregating tweets. For every phone number, we ag-
gregate all the tweets containing that phone number in a set. We
do not find a single tweet containing two phone numbers in our
dataset. This implies that every phone number Pi has a set of unique
tweets represented as T1,T2,T3, · · · . In Figure 2, P1 is associated
with {T1,T2,T3}.
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(P1T1: u11u12u13)
(P1T2: u21u22u23)
(P1T3: u31u32u33)
(P2T4: u41u42u43)
(P2T5: u51u52u53)
(P3T6: u61u62u63)
(P3T7: u71u72u73)
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Figure 2: A schematic diagram of the framework for cam-
paign identification (notation: P : a phone number, U : a uni-
gram,T : a tweet represented by a set of unigrams, D: a docu-
ment consisting of a set of similar tweets, andC: a campaign
containing a document and its associated phone number).
Step 2: Tweets to unigrams.We extract unigrams from tweets.
Each tweet Ti is now represented as {U 1i ,U 2i ,U 3i , · · · }. In Figure 2,
T1 is represented as {U 11 ,U 21 ,U 31 }.
Step 3: Extracting frequent unigram.We aggregate all tweets
containing a certain phone number and extract top 30 unigrams
that frequently appear in these tweets. This set of unigrams charac-
terizes the document associated with the phone number. In Figure
2, the set {U 11 ,U 23 } represents the document associated with P1.
Step 4: Selecting relevant tweets. From the set of tweets asso-
ciated with a certain phone number, we choose those which have at
least 5 unigrams common with the set of 30 unigrams representing
the phone number. In Figure 2, we only choose T1 and T3 to form
document D1 for P1 (note, in this example we only match at least
one unigram in each tweet instead of 5 to be qualify as a part of the
document).
Step 5: Jaccard similarity to find campaigns. Once we form
the document corresponding to a phone number, we use Jaccard
coefficient to find similarity between two documents and com-
bine them as part of the same campaign. If the Jaccard coefficient
is greater than 0.7 (experimentally calculated, as corresponding
Silhouette score is 0.8), the documents are merged and thus the
corresponding phone numbers become part of a single campaign.
In Figure 2, D1 and D2 are merged together and form campaign C1.
Using this approach, we identify 22, 390 campaigns in our dataset.
These account for 10, 962, 350 tweets posted by 670, 257 users, con-
taining 26, 610 unique phone numbers, and 893, 808 URLs. For col-
lective classification to identify campaign-specific spammers, we
need to have a set of labeled users. Therefore, we check the user ac-
counts already suspended by Twitter. This process consists of a bulk
query to Twitter’s API with the profile ID of the account. Twitter
redirects to http://twitter.com/suspended, and returns‘error 404’ in
case the user account is suspended. Since Twitter suspension algo-
rithm can have a delay in suspension, we made this query 6 months
after the data collection. We find 5, 593 user accounts to be already
suspended by Twitter. These accounts are taken later as the training
set to perform spam classification (see Section 4). Note that for fur-
ther analysis, we take campaigns that have at least one suspended
user – 3, 370 out of 22, 390 campaigns (670, 251 user accounts) are
seen to observe such behavior. We also observe 21% users to be part
of multiple campaigns (see Figure 7(b)). Figure 3 shows the word
cloud of top 2 campaigns containing the highest number of sus-
pended users – first one is a Spanish campaign (Figure 3(a)) where
people requested others to send WhatsApp invitation for receiving
adult and pornographic videos. The second campaign (Figure 3(b))
offers people reservations for parties and clubs at discounted rates.
(a) Spanish campaign sending porn
videos on WhatsApp.
(b) Party reservation campaign offering
discounted rate tickets.
Figure 3: Word cloud of top two campaigns containing max-
imum suspended users.
3 HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION
NETWORKS (HIN)
We model the entire Twitter data as a heterogeneous information
network (HIN). A HIN is a special type of information network
which contains multiple types of users or links between users [39].
Mathematically, it is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. Heterogeneous network. A large number of
OSNs are heterogeneous in nature, involving diverse relationship be-
tween the nodes. Heterogeneous network is represented as a graph,
G = {V ,E,T } in which each node v ∈ V and each link e ∈ E are
associated with their mapping functions:
ϕ(v) : V → TV
ϕ(e) : E → TE
respectively. TV ∈ T and TE ∈ T denote the sets of users and edge
types.
Our heterogeneous network contains different types of nodes
such as users, campaign, URLs, and phone numbers; edges connect-
ing two nodes represent different types of relationships (see Fig-
ure 1). A user is linked to a campaign by promoting or promoted-by
relation; a user is linked to a phone-number by sharing or shared-by
relation; a campaign is linked to a phone-number by using or
used-by relations. Two users can be connected via different paths
viz. user-phone-user, user-url-user, user-phone-url-user, and
so on. Formally, these paths are called meta-paths, as defined below.
Definition 3.2. Meta-path. A meta-path Π1.....k is a path de-
fined on the graph of network schema TG = (U ,R), and is denoted
in the form of U1
R1−−→ U2 R2−−→ U3..... Rk−−→ Uk+1 which defines a
composite relation R = R1 ◦ R2 ◦ .... ◦ Rl between typeU1 andUk+1,
where ◦ denotes the composition operator on relations. In our con-
text, U ∈ {user, campaign, phone number, URL} and R ∈ {sharing,
promoting, using}.
The length of a meta-path Π is the number of relations that exist
in Π – e.g., user-phone-user is a 2-length meta-path between a
pair of users, while a 3-length meta-path instance between two
users is user-phone-URL-user. Figure 4 depicts some example
meta-paths in our heterogeneous network. For instance, a user
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participating in a campaign and sharing a phone number can be
represented by a 2-length meta-path User-Camp-Phno.
User
Camp
Phno URL
User
Camp
URL
User
Camp
Phno
User User
Camp
Figure 4: Examples of different meta-paths present in the
network.
Given a user-specific meta-path, Π =U1,U2, .......Ut , similarity
measures can be defined for a pair of users x ∈ U1 andy ∈ U2 accord-
ing to the path instances between them following the meta-path.
Previous research has shown that including redundant meta-paths
(i.e., a smaller meta-path that can be a part of a longer meta-path)
in the collective classification may inject noise in the feature space,
which can lead to over-fitting [21]. To minimize the risk, it is advis-
able to extract meta-paths that cannot be further disintegrated to
shorter meta-paths. Themajor challenge in dealing with meta-paths
is to find all and only relevant meta-paths. Sun et al. [39] showed
that finding all possible meta-paths and picking the most relevant
out of them is an NP-hard problem, and therefore many greedy
approaches have been proposed to find relevant meta-paths [29].
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work towards modeling
Twitter as a heterogeneous network for spam campaigner detection
by extracting relevant meta-paths. Therefore, there is no prior work
suggesting possible and relevant meta-paths for our heterogeneous
network. To deal with these challenges, we propose a simple yet
efficient concept, called Hierarchical Meta-Path Scores (HMPS)
to find similarity between a pair of users by picking shortest and
relevant meta-paths (restricted to length 4) which can be used to
calculate similarity between nodes. 1 We also impose an additional
constraint on the meta-path selection - we only consider intermedi-
ate nodes of type campaign, phone number, or URL when selecting
meta-paths between two users.
4 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the overall proposed methodology for
collectively classifying users as spammers on Twitter (see Figure 5).
Why collective classification? Collective classification refers
to the combined classification of nodes based on correlations be-
tween unknown and known labels [34]. Given the labels of the
instances in training set Tr ⊂ All , the task of collective classifica-
tion in HIN is to infer the labels of the testing set (Te = All−Tr ). We
address collective classification problem using HMPS to find users
(unknown labels) that are similar to spammers (known labels). In
individual classification, nodes are classified individually without
taking into account their interdependencies via the underlying net-
work structure. However, in our heterogeneous networks, nodes are
connected by same phone number or URL. Therefore, we employ
1We experimented with meta-paths of length more than 4. The results were not that
encouraging compared to the time it takes to extract long-length meta-paths.
collective classification approach. It has been shown to achieve
better accuracy compared to independent classification [34].
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Figure 5: Proposed collective classification framework to de-
tect spammers on Twitter.
4.1 Hierarchical Meta-Path Scores (HMPS)
After identifying campaigns (see Section 2), the next step is to
measure HMPS for a user (Algorithm 1) to find the similarity of the
user with other known spammers (suspended users). To this end,
we propose an additive similarity score for a user with respect to
all the spammers in that particular campaign. Although there are
several other similarity measures available, they are biased towards
underlying network structure and prior information about relevant
meta-paths. For instance, PathSim [39] only works for symmetric
relations, HeteSim [35] relies on the relevance of a single meta-path.
Forward Stagewise Path Generation (FSPG) [29] generates the set
of most relevant meta-paths under a given regression model, which
is validated by a human expert. However, in the context of Twitter
being modeled as a HIN, the relevant meta-paths are not known.
Therefore, it is computationally intractable to find the relevance of
a meta-path.
This motivates us to propose a novel meta-path based similarity
measure, called Hierarchical Meta-Path Scores (HMPS) that captures
the similarity between two users based on the function of distance
through which they can be reached.
HIN to hierarchical structure: To measure HMPS, we model
the Twitter heterogeneous network in the form of a multi-path
hierarchical structure as shown in Figure 6. In this structure, nodes
on a meta-path are connected with their Least Common Ances-
tor (LCA) node. LCA node for users is taken as a phone number or
URL, and subsequently, campaign node is taken as the LCA node
for a phone number / URL. The purpose of LCA node is to limit the
range of operations that can be applied across two related nodes.
We choose such a structure because if two users share the same
phone number or URL for promoting campaigns, they should be
more similar rather than two users who do not share any common
phone number or URL but are still part of a single campaign. The
intuition behind HMPS is that if two users are strongly connected to
each other, the distance between them in the hierarchical structure
would be less.
The similarity score between two entities x and y is a real number,
computed by a function F of the similarity scores for each meta-
path of a set Θ : Ψ(x ,y | Θ) = F (max{ϕ(x ,y | Πi ) | 1 ⩽ i ⩽ p)}),
where ϕ(x ,y | Πi ) is a similarity score between x and y given meta-
path Πi ,Θ = Π1, ...,Πp , and F is the maximum similarity score
over the ‘p’ meta-paths. Then the HMPS of an entity x is defined as:
HMPS(x) = ∑y∈S Ψ(x ,y), where S is the set of spammers in the
campaign where x belongs to.
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Camp1
URL1
User3 User4User2User1
URL2
User5 User6
Phone1
W (User5, Phone1)
W (Phone1, Camp1) W (Camp1, URL2)
W (URL2, User6)
Phone2
Figure 6: A hierarchal structure to measure HMPS of users.
Users with red color are known spammers.
For every user, HMPS is calculated with respect to each spammer
(suspended user) in the campaign, and the scores are finally added,
as shown in Algorithm 1. Following are the weights used for each
edge in the hierarchical structure.
• W(Useri , Phonej ): This is the weight of the edge connecting
a user and a phone number, and is measured as the ratio of
tweets propagated byUseri containing Phonej over all the
tweets containing Phonej .
• W(Useri ,URLj ): This is the weight of the edge connecting
a user and a URL, and is measured as the ratio of tweets
propagated by Useri containing URLj over all the tweets
containingURLj.
• W(Campi , Phonej ): This is the weight of the edge connecting
a campaign and a phone number, and is measured as the
ratio of tweets containing Phonej in Campi over cumulative
frequency of URLs and phone numbers in Campi .
• W(Campi ,URLj ):This is theweight of the edge connecting a
campaign and a URL, and is measured as the ratio of tweets
containing URLj in Campi over cumulative frequency of
URLs and phone numbers in Campi .
Let us assume that we want to calculate the HMPS forUser1 (un-
known) shown in Figure 6. The campaign contains two suspended
users,User2 andUser4. So the HMPS score ofUser1 is calculated
w.r.t.User2 andUser4 as follows:
• Weight between User1 and User2,W1:W (User1, Phone2) .
W (User2, Phone2)
• Weight betweenUser1 andUser4,W2: maximum score calcu-
lated for 2 possible meta-paths, i.e., User1-URL1-User4 and
User1-Phno2-Camp1-URL1-User4;W2 =max (W (User1,URL1)
.W (User4,URL1),W (User1, Phone2) .W (Camp1, Phone2) .
W (Camp1,URL1) .W (User4,URL1))
• The final HMPS ofUser1, HMPS (User1)=W1 +W2.
Note that in order to measure the HMPS for each user from the
hierarchical structure, we build the hierarchical structure for indi-
vidual campaigns separately instead of combining all the campaigns
due to the following two reasons: (i) it is computationally expensive
to find meta-paths for all the connections of users across campaigns
from a large hierarchical structure, and (ii) HMPS is an absolute
value; global HMPS can result in wrong labeling. Specifically, if a
spammer (S) has HMPS valueX in campaignC1 and other unknown
user (U ) has same value X in another campaign C2, then U will be
wrongly labeled as a spammer. It might not be a spammer based on
HMPS calculated within that campaign.
Algorithm 1 HMPS for Collective Classification
1: for Campi ∈ Campaiдns do
2: S = Set of known spammers in Campi (m = |S |); U = Set of
unknown users in Campi ; n = Total number of users in Campi
3: scorei ← ∑mj=1 HMPS(Ui , Sj , Campi )∀i ∈ [1, n]
4: end for
5: procedure HMPS(u , s , camp)
6: r es = 0
7: for i ∈ Parent (u) do ▷ Parent (u) = Immediate antecedent of u
8: for j ∈ Parent (u) do
9: if i == j then ▷W (s, j)=weight of the edge ⟨s, j ⟩ in the
hierarchical structure
10: ifW (u, i).W (s, j) > r es then
11: r es ←W (u, i).W (s, j)
12: end if
13: else
14: if W (u, i).W (s, j).W (i, camp).W (j, camp) > r es
then
15: r es ←W (u, i).W (s, j).W (i, camp).W (j, camp)
16: end if
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: return r es
21: end procedure
4.2 Active Learning with Feedback
As we consider only those campaigns which contain more than
one suspended user (spammer), the classes (spammers and non-
spammers) present in our dataset would be highly imbalanced.
Exiting research has shown that one-class classification (OCC)
achieves much better performance than two-class classification if:
(i) there is highly imbalanced dataset [33] and the target class is
prevalent in the training set, (ii) the unknown instances do not
belong to any known class, or (iii) the unknown instances are
difficult to be categorized into a known class due to several reasons
such as lack of annotators, lack of enough evidences etc. OCC is
trained only on the target class (which is spam in our case), and
its task is to define a classification boundary around the target
class, such that it accepts as many instances as possible from the
target class, while it minimizes the chance of accepting the outlier
instances. In OCC, since only one side of the boundary can be
determined, it is hard to decide from just one-class how tightly the
boundary should fit in each of the directions around the data. It is
also hard to decide which features should be used to find the best
separation of the target and outlier class instances.
Learning with feedback: We would like to reiterate that we
picked individual campaigns and not the entire dataset together
since the HMPS local to a campaign helps in finding similar users
better (see Section 4.1). Each campaign is associated with a su-
pervised classifier (one-class classifier in our case). Out of 3, 370
campaigns in the dataset that have at least one suspended user, not
all campaigns have sufficient training samples to train the models,
as shown in Figure 7(a). However, the process of human annota-
tion to enrich the training set can be costly. To reduce the effort
of human labeling, one can obtain meaningful shreds of evidence
from some external sources and incorporate them into the training
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set. For instance, in ensemble learning, one can leverage the output
class of unknown objects obtained from one classifier and feed them
into the other classifiers. This might be related to active learning,
where given a pool of unlabeled data, one can try to select a set of
training examples actively to reach a minimum classification error.
Since individual campaigns may not have significant training
instances, we propose an active learning approach with feedback
to collect cues about unknown users from multiple campaigns to
enlarge the individual training set associated with each campaign-
specific model. We further notice that campaigns have significant
user overlap – 21% users belong to multiple campaigns (see Fig-
ure 7(b) for the distribution of overlapping users). Presence of user
overlap further motivates us to incorporate the feedback-based
model as follows.
(a) Number of suspended users per cam-
paign.
(b) Overlapping users in campaings.
Figure 7: Distribution of the (a) suspended and (b) overlap-
ping users (users belonging to multiple campaigns) in our
dataset. The number of suspended users per campaign is
less. Therefore, to increase the training samples, overlap-
ping users are picked for human annotation.
Let us assume that useru is classified as a spammer by a classifier
(associated with a campaign say, Cami ) with high confidence. If u
is also a part of some other campaigns (say, Camj ) where the class
of u is unknown, we assign u to the training set ofCamj along with
its class as a spammer. In this way, we keep increasing the size of
the training set of individual classifiers (see Figure 8 for a schematic
diagram of our proposed feedback-based active learning method).
Overall, we perform the following steps:
• An initial set of labeled instances is used for training individ-
ual classifiers. Since one-class classifier is used, the training
set consists of only the spammers (suspended Twitter ac-
counts). Each campaign-specific classifier is then used to
label the unknown users.
• From each set of unknown users labeled by the classifier, we
choose a subset of users according to the selection criterion
(mentioned later). The selected users are then augmented
with the training set of other classifiers whose corresponding
campaigns also contain these users.
• These steps are iteratively executed for all the campaigns.
This constitutes level 1 of the iteration (as shown in Figure
8). At the end of this level, we obtain a set of new training
set for each classifier.
• In the next level, the new training set is introduced to the
classifier and used to predict the class of the rest of the
unknown users. This constitutes level 2 of the iteration. The
above process convergences once we obtain no more labeled
user from the current level to be augmented further with the
training set of any classifier in the next level.
Selection criterion: It is important to decide a selection crite-
rion to choose a subset of users from the output of the classifiers;
inappropriate criterion might inject noise in the training set that
will propagate throughout succeeding levels. We propose the fol-
lowing criterion for selecting users:
Given (a) a one-class classifier C , represented by the
function f (x) which, for an instance x , provides the
distance of x from the classification boundary, and (b)
X , a set of unlabeled instances, we take the maximum
distance among all the training samples from the deci-
sion boundary, T cmax = maxx ∈X f (x). Now, from the
unknown set Xu which are labeled by C , we choose
those instances X ′u such that ∀x ∈ X ′u : f (x) ≥ T cmax .
Note that the thresholdT cmax is specific to a campaign.
U1 U3U2 U4
Level 1
U1: 1 U3: ukU2: uk U4: uk
U2U4
Level 2
U2: 1U4: uk
U3 U6U4 U5
U3: 1 U6: ukU4: uk U5:1 
U4 U6
U4: uk U6: 1
U5 U7U6 U8
U5: uk U7: 1U6: uk U8: uk
U4
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U4: uk
U4
U4: uk
U3
Training
Classifier 1 
Training
Classifier 2 
Training
Classifier 3 
Training
Classifier 1 
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Classifier 2 
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Classifier 1 
Training
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Training
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U5, U6U3,U2 U3
U1
U1 U7
Figure 8: A schematic diagram of active learning with feed-
back amongst campaign-specific classifiers.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we start by presenting the baseline methods used
to compare with our method, followed by a detailed comparative
evaluation.
5.1 Baseline Methods
We compare our method with three state-of-art methods proposed
in the literature for spam detection in general. However, none of
them focused on phone number specific spammers whose dynamics
are different (as mentioned in Section 2). Since we did not obtain the
source code, we implemented the methods on our own. Note that
all the baselines originally used 2-class classifiers. However, in this
paper, we show the results of the baselines both for one-class and
2-class classifications after suitable hyper-parameter optimization.
Baseline 1:We consider the spam detection method proposed
by Benevenuto et al. [2] as our first baseline. They proposed the
following OSN-based features (referred as OSN1) per user: fraction
of tweets with URLs, age of the user account, average number
of URLs per tweet, fraction of followers per followee, fraction of
tweets the user replied, number of tweets the user replied, number
of tweets the user receives a reply, number of friends and followers,
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average number of hashtags per tweet. They showed that the SVM-
based classifier performs best.
Baseline 2: We consider the method proposed by Khan et al.
[19] to segregate spammers from genuine experts on Twitter as our
second baseline. They suggested the following features (referred as
OSN2): authority and hub scores of users in the follower-followee
network, fraction of the user’s tweets that contain the URLs, average
number of URLs in a tweet, average number of URLs per number
of words in a tweet of the user, average number of hashtags per
number of words in a tweet, and average number of hashtags in a
tweet. They showed that Logistic Regression performs best.
Baseline 3: We consider the method proposed by Adewole et
al. [1] to detect spam messages and spam user accounts as our third
baseline. They proposed the following list of profile and content-
based features (referred as OSN3): length of the screen name based
on characters, the presence or absence of profile location, whether
the user includes URL or not in his profile, age of the account in
days, number of followers of the user, number of friends / follow-
ers of the user, total statuses of the account, number of tweets
the user has favorited, indicating presence or absence of profile
description, whether the user has not modified the theme of their
profile, presence or absence of time zone, whether the account
has been verified or not, whether the user has not changed the
default profile egg avatar, number of the public lists the user is
a member, whether or not the user has enabled the possibility of
geo-tagging their tweets, normalized ratio of followers to friends,
ratio of the number of follower to friends, ratio of the number of
friends to followers, (total, unique, and mean) number of tweets,
hashtags, URLs, mentions, favorite count, and retweets, ratio of
(hashtags, URLs, mentions, retweets) to total number of tweets,
(hashtag, URLs, mention, retweet, tweet-length) deviation, average
number of daily tweets, average tweet length, popularity ration,
number of duplicate tweets, and maximum value of hashtag fre-
quency. They showed that Random Forest performs best for the
classification task.
Note that previous work considered only those campaigns which
involve only URLs [1, 2, 19]. In our work, a phone number, being a
stable resource, helped in forming campaigns better. Besides, most
of the OSN features used in the baselines are easy to evade by
spammers, whereas HMPS-based feature is difficult to manipulate.
5.2 Experimental Setup
Our proposed classification method is run separately with differ-
ent features (HMPS, OSN1, OSN2, and OSN3) and their combi-
nations. We use the standard grid-search technique to tune the
hyper-parameters. For evaluation, we design two experimental
settings:
(i) Setting 1: Our primary goal is to detect user accounts which are
suspended by Twitter because they are spam accounts. Therefore,
the set of suspended accounts constitutes the ground-truth for the
classifiers. Out of all suspended accounts present in our dataset
(mentioned in Section 2), we adopt leave-one-out cross-validation
technique (due to the very limited number of suspended accounts)
and report the average accuracy of the classifiers. Note that in this
setting, we use one-class classifier for all the competing methods.
(ii) Setting 2:We believe that our method is capable of detecting
those accounts which are spammers, but not suspended by Twitter
yet. Therefore, we further invited human annotators2 to annotate
some non-suspended accounts as spammers or non-spammers. This
will further help us to run the baseline methods which originally
used binary classifiers (see Section 5.4). Since it is not possible to
label all non-suspended users, we adopt a convenient sampling ap-
proach. We define user bins according to the number of campaigns
the non-suspended users exist (see the distribution in Figure 7(b)).
Our sampling approach preferentially chooses users who are part
of multiple campaigns to maximize the evidence per campaign –
the probability of choosing a user belonging to multiple campaigns
is higher than that for a user who is a part of a single campaign. Fol-
lowing this approach, we picked 700 users from 3, 370 campaigns.
Each user was labeled by three human annotators as spammers or
non-spammers, and then the majority vote was considered as the
final class. The inter-annotator agreement was 0.82 according to
Cohen’s kappa measure.
Out of 700 manually annotated accounts, we hold out 20% of
the dataset to be used as the test set in Setting 2. We repeat this
experiment 50 times and report the average accuracy. Here also, we
use one-class classifier for all the competing methods and consider
‘spammer’ as our target class.
Evaluation metrics: For comparative evaluation, we use the
standard information retrieval metrics – Precision, Recall, F1-score,
Area under the ROC curve (AUC).
5.3 Comparative Evaluation
Table 1 shows the performance of the competing methods for both
settings.We report the results of our active-learning based one-class
classifier with different feature combinations. 3 For setting 1 (leave-
one-out), we report the performance w.r.t the accuracy (fraction of
known spammers identified by the method) and observe that our
method performs significantly well with only HMPS feature – it
achieves an accuracy of 0.77, outperforming all baseline methods.
However, incorporating OSN2 features along with HMPS further
enhances 9.1% performance of our classifier, achieving an accuracy
of 0.84.
A similar pattern is observed for setting 2. However, here our
model with only HMPS turns out to be even stronger classifier,
outperforming all others in terms of precision (0.99), F1-score (0.93)
and AUC (0.88). Here also, incorporating most of the OSN fea-
tures with HMPS does not enhance the performance of our method
(or sometimes deteriorates the performance), except ONS2 which
seems to be quite competitive. However, baseline 2 seems to be
the best method w.r.t recall (0.92); but it significantly sacrifices the
performance w.r.t. precision, F1-score, and AUC.
Nevertheless, we consider the following setting as our de-
fault method since it outperforms other methods in almost
all experimental setup: HMPS + OSN2 + one-class classifier
+ active learning. Baseline 2 is considered as the best baseline
method in the rest of the paper.
2All annotators were security researchers between the age group of 25 - 35 years.
3We tried with other combinations as well such as HMPS+OSN1+OSN2,
HMPS+OSN2+OSN3 etc. The results were not encouraging enough to be reported in
the paper.
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Table 1: Comparative evaluation of the competing methods
on two different experimental settings. For all the methods,
one-class classifier is used. The colored row shows the per-
formance (P: Precision, R: Recall, F1: F1-score) of our de-
fault method. The last row shows the results of our default
method without active learning (see Section 5.5).
Method Feature Setting 1 Setting 2Accuracy P R F1 AUC
Baseline 1 OSN1 0.62 0.86 0.71 0.77 0.48
Baseline 2 OSN2 0.58 0.84 0.92 0.87 0.52
Baseline 3 OSN3 0.62 0.86 0.66 0.74 0.47
Our
HMPS 0.77 0.99 0.87 0.93 0.88
HMPS + OSN1 0.76 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.72
HMPS + OSN2 0.84 0.98 0.88 0.93 0.87
HMPS + OSN3 0.70 0.88 0.73 0.80 0.59
Our HMPS + OSN2 – 0.42 0.98 0.55 0.51- Active Learning
Justification behind superior performance of HMPS: All of
the baseline methods rely on the features that can be changed over
time. These methods either consider URL attributes (baselines 1 and
3) within the tweets or changes in profile characteristics between a
legitimate and spam user account (baselines 2 and 3). Given these
specificities, it is easy for a spammer to manipulate these features.
In contrast, HMPS relies on the monetization infrastructure (phone
numbers) to identify campaigns and spammers. As discussed ear-
lier, we aggregate tweets as part of the same campaign when they
use multiple phone numbers wrapped around similar text. As a
result, our method is resilient to spammers’ manipulation. Further-
more, to understand how HMPS helps in improving the detection
of spammers over the baselines, we manually analyze a sample of
‘spammers’. Some of the users not identified by baselines 1 and 3
as spammers have a balanced number of friends and followers and
a low number of tweets. In addition, users were not using URLs to
spread the campaign. Therefore, all URL-based features do not aid
in the detection task.
Baseline 2 measures the authority and hub scores based on the
tweets with hashtags. As a result, it wrongly detects some benign
users as spammers that were retweeting posts related to (say,) blood
donation campaigns. When baseline 2 is combined with HMPS, the
false positive rate is reduced since these users are not found in the
spammer network.
In addition, HMPS can find spammers that are not suspended
by Twitter yet. For instance, Figure 9 shows a spammer account
that clearly violates the Twitter policy by promoting and posting
repeated, pornographic content. 4 Surprisingly, this account has not
been suspended by Twitter yet. However, we found similar such
accounts suspended by Twitter. Interestingly, our system was able
to identify this account as a spammer.
These examples show that HMPS can identify spammers that
use phone numbers, which are not detected by the baseline sys-
tems and / or Twitter, and is, therefore, more effective in detecting
spammers that spread phone numbers to promote campaigns.
4https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311
(a) (b)
Figure 9: An example spammer account (bio shown in (a),
timeline shown in (b)) that has not been suspended by Twit-
ter yet, but our system could detect it as spammer.
5.4 One-class vs. 2-class Classifier
One may argue that the results reported in Table 1 may not re-
flect the original performance of the baseline methods since all
the baseline methods originally used 2-class classifiers. Moreover,
there was no empirical justification for adopting one-class classifier
over 2-class classifier. To address these arguments, here we exactly
replicate the baseline methods by considering the best 2-class clas-
sifier per baseline reported in the papers. We choose a balanced
dataset of 150 suspended and 150 non-suspended users randomly
sampled from our manually labeled dataset (see setting 2 in Section
5.2). For comparative evaluation, we consider several state-of-the-
art 2-class classifiers (Logistic regression (LR), Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA), K-nearest neighbors (KNN), Decision Tree (DT),
Naive Bayes (NB), Random Forest (RF), and Support Vector Machine
(SVM)) and adopt them into our active learning framework. Table 2
shows that none of the baselines and our adopted 2-class classi-
fiers outperform our default one-class classifier (last row of Table
2). Our default method is 12.6%, 7.7%, 10.7% and 9.7% higher than
the second-ranked method (Decision Tree) in terms of precision,
recall, F1-score, and AUC respectively. This result indicates that
one-class classification is always helpful for the application where
there is limited labeled data, and the label of most of the instances
is unknown.
Table 2: Results of 2-class classifiers and comparison with
our default one-class classifier. Here, the best 2-class classi-
fiers reported in the papers are considered for the baselines.
Method Precision Recall F1-score AUC
Baseline 1 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.50
Baseline 2 0.47 0.57 0.51 0.50
Baseline 3 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.57
HMPC + 2-class classifier
LR 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.58
LDA 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.58
KNN 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74
DT 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
NB 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.58
SVM 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.63
RF 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82
Our default one-class classifier
HMPS+OSN2 0.95 0.90 0.93 0.92
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Table 3: Comparison of our feedback-based learning ap-
proach with standard oversampling approach (SMOTE). The
term ‘Ratio’ indicates the fraction of training set taken as
the number of synthetic samples generated by the oversam-
pling technique.
Oversampling + default one-class classifier
Precision Recall F1-Score AUC
Ratio = 0.20 0.90 0.64 0.64 0.59
Ratio = 0.30 0.88 0.74 0.74 0.63
Ratio = 0.50 0.81 0.71 0.68 0.58
Ratio = 0.75 0.91 0.68 0.69 0.56
Ratio = 1 0.91 0.68 0.70 0.57
Feedback + default one-class classifier
0.95 0.90 0.93 0.92
5.5 General vs. Active Leaning
We argue that since the number of training samples is not sufficient
for individual classifiers, feedback from one classifier to another
would increase the training set that in turn enhances the perfor-
mance of the classifier. To verify our argument, we run our default
method without active learning (without feedback) and observe
that although recall increases significantly (0.98), it degrades the
performance w.r.t. other performance measures – 57.1%, 40.8% and
41.3% degradation of precision, F1-score and AUC respectively (see
the last row of Table 1). High recall with low precision indicates
that most of the unknown users are classified as spammers by the
general classifier. It happens due to the limited labeled data, which
active learning can efficiently handle.
5.6 Feedback vs. Oversampling
Since the size of the training set is small for each campaign-specific
classifier, we use feedback across campaigns to increase the training
set. As an alternative, one can also use other state-of-the-art over-
sampling techniques such as SMOTE [7]. Here, we adapt SMOTE
for increasing the size of the training data (i.e., target class: spam-
mers). The training set is oversampled by taking each training
sample and introducing synthetic examples along the line segments
joining any / all k neighbors of the training sample. Depending
on the amount of oversampling required, k-nearest neighbors are
randomly chosen. Table 3 shows the results for different values of
oversampling ratio, i.e., the fraction of training set taken as the num-
ber of synthetic samples. In addition, we perform the oversampling
technique before dividing the data into training and validation to
ensure that the information from the training set is used in build-
ing the classifier. Table 3 shows that even after varying the ratio
for oversampling, none of the cases can achieve the accuracy ob-
tained from our feedback-based learning approach. This indicates
that our feedback-based learning strategy is superior to the other
oversampling strategy.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we highlight the prior work on classification, clus-
tering, and similarity tasks carried out using meta-paths. We also
discuss several existing techniques to identify spammers.
Meta-path classification: Sun et al. [39] first proposed the
idea of meta-path in heterogeneous network. Since then, it has
been used extensively in various applications such as classifica-
tion [20, 26], clustering [40], and similarity measures [36, 39]. Sun
et al. proposed a measure called “PathSim” which outperformed
Path Constrained Random Walk (PCRW) proposed by [23]. Meng
et al. introduced biased constraint random walk to handle both
symmetric and non-symmetric meta-paths [29]. They proposed
Forward Stagewise Path Generation algorithm (or FSPG), which
derives meta-paths that best predict the similarity between a node
pair. Shi et al. proposed “HeteSim” to measure the relevance of any
node pair in a meta-path [35]. To overcome the computational and
memory complexity of HeteSim, Meng et al. proposed “AvgSim”
that measures similarity score through two random walk processes
along the given meta-path and the reverse meta-path [30]. Besides
these similarity measures, Zhang et al. found node similarity based
on connections between centers in X-star network [46]. While
previous work considered meta-paths for classification assuming
relevant meta-paths are known or finding greedy approaches to
identify relevant meta-paths, in this work, we model Twitter as a
heterogeneous network where relevant meta-paths are unknown.
We further propose Hierarchical Meta-Path Scores to predict an
unknown user as a spammer based on its neighboring spammers.
Spammer classification: Previous literature has addressed the
problem of spam and spammers on Twitter and other OSNs [4–
6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 25, 27, 38, 41, 42, 44]. Benevenuto et al. used
OSN based features to detect spammers on YouTube, with an accu-
racy of 98% [2, 3]. Researchers have identified spammers on Twit-
ter [24, 28, 43] and blogging websites [19] using user-based features.
Previous literature has also looked into identifying fake accounts on
OSNs by examining characteristics of user profiles [37], by learning
typical behavior of an account and flagging an account as suspi-
cious in case of deviation [12], similarity to social bots [11, 15], or
building a system that considers differences in which legitimate
and malicious messages propagate through the network [32]. Link
farming in Twitter where spammers acquire a large number of fol-
lower links has been investigated by Ghosh et al. [17]. These works
treat OSN as a homogeneous network. Modeling OSNs as hetero-
geneous networks provide us several ways to capture structural
similarity between a pair of nodes via meta-paths. In this work, we
also demonstrated that our model works better than the baseline
models that use only OSN-based features for classification.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we detected spammers spreading spam campaigns
using phone numbers on Twitter. We modeled Twitter as a hetero-
geneous network and proposed a collective classification approach
that leverages heterogeneous nodes and their interconnections to
identify unknown users as spammers. The significant contribu-
tions of our method are three-fold: (i) our proposed Hierarchical
Meta-Path Score (HMPS) can efficiently measure how close an
unknown user is w.r.t other known spammers; (ii) our proposed
feedback-based active learning strategy is effective over three other
baselines that use 2-class classifiers for spam detection; (iii) in case
of small number of training instances, our proposed feedback strat-
egy performs significantly better than other oversampling strate-
gies. Through a case study and human-annotated dataset, we also
showed that our method could find spammer accounts that are not
suspended by Twitter yet.
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